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REASON'S RAPPORT:
PASCALIAN REFLECTIONS ON THE
PERSUASIVENESS OF NATURAL THEOLOGY
William D. Wood

The widespread rejection of natural theology presents a serious problem for its
adherents. In dialogue with Pascal, I explain why natural theology so often
fails to persuade and suggest some ways in which it can become more persuasive. I argue that persuasiveness is a function of attractiveness and that attractiveness is a function of our rapport with a given attractive thing. Natural theology thus ought to show people that they share rapport with God. In order
to do this, however, it must become more imaginative, since we are strongly
attracted to the products of our own imagination. I commend both Pascal's
use of the form of the fragment and his artful rhetoric in the wager fragment,
which I read as a fine example of imaginative natural theology.

Natural theology is perhaps unique among methods of inquiry in that its
most determined opponents are frequently found among those most committed to the truth of its conclusions. It is no surprise that avowed atheists
scorn arguments that purport to demonstrate the existence of God. More
interesting, however, are those committed Christian theists who also reject
the project of natural theology.l Their number is legion. Indeed, it seems
to be the case that not only are most opponents of nahlral theology theists,
but also that most theists are opponents of natural theology. Theists
oppose natural theology for a variety of reasons. Speaking very roughly,
we may isolate three fronts of opposition. These three positions are logically distinct but mutually supportive, so it is not uncommon that a single
theist (Karl Barth, for instance) affirms all three.
First, some theists argue that natural theology is conceptually incoherent.
They thereby agree with religious skeptics that there can be no successful
arguments, or complex of arguments, that prove that God exists. Such theists do not find this state-of-affairs troubling, however, because they
believe that God's "existence" is of a sort that transcends logical or empirical demonstration. Second, other theists argue that the real problem with
natural theology is that it is idolatrous. Such theists assert that knowledge
of God comes only as a result of the free and sovereign revelation of God.
On this account, any attempt to use human reason to compel God to reveal
Godself is not just incoherent but positively sinful. Finally, a third group of
theists claims that nahlral theology is, in point of fact, useless, irrespective
of the previous two considerations. They ask: who are the arguments of
natural theology for? Theists, being theists, won't need them. Atheists
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simply won't find them convincing. To these opponents, the whole business of natural theology seems like a species of intellectual vanity that is
best avoided.
On both philosophical and theological grounds, the first two of these
positions seem quite wrong to me, but I will not argue against them here.
Instead, I will simply assume that the project of natural theology broadly
construed - the project of using unaided human reason to demonstrate the
existence of God - is neither incoherent nor idolatrous.2 Even after this sizable assumption, however, the third objection to natural theology still
seems to have real force. Has anyone ever become convinced of God's
existence after mastering, say, Richard Swinburne's inductive arguments
in favor of its Bayesian probability? Or after pondering the subtleties of the
modal variant of the ontological argument? It is not unfair to say that natural theology seems spectacularly ill-equipped to carry out its own task, if
part of that task is actually convincing people to believe in God.
One figure who thought a great deal about the proper relationship of
Christian faith and natural theology is Blaise Pascal. Pascal is frequently
regarded as an opponent of natural theology and, indeed, we can easily
find among his Pensees fragments that suggest that he would endorse all
three of the theistic objections outlined above. Pascal's exact position on
natural theology is difficult to determine, in part because of the very fragmentary character of the Pensees, and so it has been the subject of a great
deal of scholarly attention. The dominant strain of scholarship claims that
Pascal's religious fideism and epistemological anti-foundationalism lead
him to reject any kind of natural theology. Other scholars, however, point
to the role that evidential arguments and proofs play in the Pensees and
argue that Pascal's rejection of natural theology is not as uncompromising
as it first appears. 3 For the most part, both groups of scholars seek to determine whether Pascal believes that natural theology is possible, on either
philosophical or religious grounds. In other words, they focus on Pascal's
treatment of what I am calling the first and second theistic objections to
natural theology. They say comparatively little about the third objection,
even though Pascal himself devotes a great deal of attention to it.
In this paper I first argue that the fact that natural theology is widely
rejected poses a serious problem for its adherents, committed as they are to
the truth of its conclusions. I next suggest that in order to understand this
widespread rejection, we should look first for an account of what makes
things in general seem attractive. I argue, in dialogue with Pascal, that
attractiveness is a function of our rapport with particular attractive things
and that we do not find belief in God attractive because we seem to share
no rapport with God. I further argue that it is the power of the imagination that makes things seem attractive and that we use our imaginations to
create a beguiling but false self that seems to share no rapport with God.
Thus, if natural theology would become more convincing, it must first seek
to persuade people that they can (and do) share rapport with God. In
order to do this, however, natural theology must itself become more imaginative and must pay greater attention to its literary and rhetorical form. I
conclude by commending the form of the fragment as an appropriate form
for natural theology and by offering a reading of Pascal's famous wager
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fragment that highlights its attentiveness to the dynamics of rapport.
Although I look to Pascal for inspiration at every turn, I must emphasize at
the outset that mine is a constructive rather than a historical-exegetical
interpretation of his thought. As a result, I draw from Pascal freely, completely neglecting some central elements of the Pensees (the heart and the
three orders, for example) and elevating other seemingly obscure elements
(especially the idea of rapport) to central importance.
I.

In this section, I argue that we Christians who believe that natural theology
is a worthwhile endeavor face a special dilemma. By virtue of our belief in
its worthiness, we must affirm either (1) that sound arguments concluding
that God exists have already been discovered or (2) that, although they
have not yet been discovered, such arguments are available in principle.4
In the first case we must ask ourselves why these supposedly sound arguments command such small respect from the community best equipped to
evaluate them, philosophers and theologians. (We must also admit that
the arguments of natural theology rarely lead laypeople to believe in God
either.) The second case is trickier - certainly, we shouldn't rule out the
discovery of some knock-down argument that silences all skeptics - but,
apart from such an tiber-argument, it seems fair to say that the future will
look much like the present, which is to say that future work in natural theology will be widely regarded as suspect and unconvincing. Hence our
dilemma: even when natural theology succeeds, it fails- because we cannot convince anyone of its success.
Note that I do not conflate an argument's soundness with its persuasiveness. I do not claim that all persuasive arguments are sound or that all
sound arguments are persuasive. Neither do I conflate an argument's persuasiveness to experts with its persuasiveness to laypeople, nor suggest
that the absence of the latter devalues the former. Nevertheless, it seems
intuitively plausible that, at a minimum, a sound argument offered in good
faith ought to be convincing to a large subset of those who are equipped to
understand it. Yet such does not seem to be the case with natural theology.
Of course, philosophers thoroughly disagree about basic questions of
ontology, epistemology, etc., so perhaps we should not expect widespread
agreement about the conclusions of natural theology. I suggest, however,
that this line of defense is not really open to the Christian natural theologian. Technical philosophical positions about ontology, epistemology or
whatnot are abstruse and widespread disagreement about them is just
what we would expect. But the Christian natural theologian cannot legitimately group arguments about the existence of God with these other technical disputes. For the Christian natural theologian (qua Christian) maintains that every human being was created by God and for God, and that
every heart is restless until it rests in God. He should therefore expect that
arguments about the existence of God would be more persuasive, not less
persuasive, than other philosophical arguments. Our hearts aren't restless
until they determine whether justified true belief really is knowledge, after
all. If anything, the natural theologian ought to expect that philosophers
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(indeed, all human beings) would have a cognitive bias ill favor of belief in
God, not against it.
It is also worth noting that certain traditional explanations are not open
to the natural theologian (qua natural theologian) without heavy qualification. For example, if a natural theologian appeals to the noetic effects of sin
in order to explain why some putatively sound argument is not widely
regarded as persuasive, then he must also be prepared to explain how,
given the noetic effects of sin, he himself was able to recognize the soundness of the argument. For if he needed a special infusion of grace or deep
catechesis from the Christian community in order to recognize the soundness of his own argument, then he must expect that others will need similar aids, a result that seems to undercut his belief that natural theology is a
worthwhile endeavor. We might proceed similarly with respect to the doctrine of the hiddenness of God, another traditional explanation for why the
arguments of natural theology fail. Presumably, God is hidden from the
natural theologian no less than from the skeptic. In general, it seems that
the natural theologian cannot regard human sinfulness or divine hiddenness as essential cognitive barriers to belief in the existence of God, and so
she must regard them as barriers that can be overcome by adroit argument.
To reiterate: the Christian natural theologian cannot affirm that there
are barriers that, in principle, prevent the discovery of sound arguments
that prove God's existence. Nor can she affirm that there are barriers that,
in principle, prevent those arguments from being persuasive (else natural
theology would not be worthwhile). So she believes, qua natural theologian, that there are (or can be) sound and persuasive arguments that
demonstrate God's existence. But, given that every human being was created by and for God, she ought also to believe that the background conditions for assent to the conclusions of her arguments are more favorable, not
less favorable, than the background conditions for assent to other disputed
philosophical claims. Thus, the fact that her arguments do not command
widespread assent is a real problem for the Christian natural theologian,
one that cries out for explanation.
II.

In this section I develop an explanation, drawn from Pascal, for why natural
theology so often fails to convince. The explanation that I propose can, I
believe, account for the fact that the arguments of natural theology command little assent while nevertheless affirming its value as a worthwhile
endeavor. To begin, let us first reformulate our question. Instead of asking
why the arguments of natural theology are unpersuasive, let us ask instead
why belief in God is not attractive. Having thus reformulated our question,
we may ask another: what makes something, anything, attractive? I intend
no sleight of hand here. This move is merely a step up in generality, a move
from the more particular to the more general. Persuasiveness is a feature of
arguments, but attractiveness is a feature of many things. Perhaps, by moving from talk about persuasiveness to talk about attractiveness, we can learn
something about what makes an argument persuasive.
Pascal writes that "there is a certain model of attractiveness and beauty
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consisting in a certain relation [rapport] between our nature, weak or strong
as it may be, and the thing which pleases us" (585).5 It is instructive that
Pascal locates the source of attractiveness in the rapport between our nature
and the particular attractive thing and not in the thing itself. '!he word "rapport" and its variants appear in some of the key fragments of the Pensees. 6
English editions of the Pensees usually translate "rapport" as "relationship"
and "rapporter" as "to relate," and, indeed, these are the ordinary renderings
of these words. The French word "rapport," however, has valences not
quite captured by the English word "relationship." Whereas "relationship"
is a neutral term, "rapport" connotes value. This was also true in Pascal's
time: the relevant sub-section of one 17th century French dictionary begins
its definition of "rapport" with "convenance," (fitness / propriety / seemliness)
and continues with "resemblance" and "conformite" (resemblance and conformity)? To say, for example, that there is "a rapport between man and all he
knows" (199) is to say more than that some relationship obtains between the
two. It is to say that the relationship that obtains is appropriate and that a
man's knowledge befits his state as a finite human being. Similarly, it is not
the case that there is no "relationship" between God and the human being
(418). There is, Pascal would certainly affirm, at the minimum the relationship of creator to creature. But, despite this relationship, the human being is
not conformed to God, does not resemble God, and is not fitted to matters
divine. We have no rapport with God.
The notion of rapport is of special importance to the task of natural theology. Adherents of natural theology typically try to offer arguments that
God's existence is necessary, probable, or rationally affirmed. Pascal's
great insight is that such arguments fail to address the deeper problem that
is at the root of our unbelief. That deeper problem is the failure to find
truths about God attractive, which is in tum rooted in our lack of rapport
with God. The unbeliever does not find belief in God attractive because he
has no way, given God's sheer difference, to relate the attractions of theistic
belief to the attractions that he already accepts. On this understanding, the
problem with natural theology is not that it is idolatrous or unsound, but
that its conclusions are not attractive and are thus incapable of inciting
belief. In other words, the failure of natural theology is not a failure of reason, but a failure to be moved by reason. Pascal's comment in fragment
190 is instructive: "'!he metaphysical proofs for the existence of God are so
remote from human reasoning and so involved that they make little
impact, and, even if they did help some people, it would only be for the
moment during which they watched the demonstration, because an hour
later they would be afraid they had made a mistake." Note that Pascal
does not say that the proofs are false, and note that he assumes that it is
possible that they could help some people. '!he problem is not with their
soundness, but with the fact that their form (logical argumentation) is not
suited to their content (truths about God) and thus can incite belief only for
a short time, if at all.
The arguments of natural theology are unpersuasive because belief in
God is unattractive. In a shorter work called The Art of Persuasion, Pascal
makes explicit the link between persuasiveness, attractiveness and rapport.
He writes that when we wish to persuade someone of something:
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we must take into consideration the person with whom we are concerned, of whom we know the mind and heart, the principles admitted, and the things loved; and then we must take note, in the matter
concerned, the rapport it has with admitted truths or of the objects of
delight through the charms we attribute to them. s
This passage, along with fragment 585 (above) suggests that, according to
Pascal, we are likely to regard a potential belief as attractive when we perceive the appropriate rapport between ourselves as knowing subjects, our
existing beliefs, and the potential belief in question. In other words, we are
likely to be attracted to beliefs that fit in with, resemble, and conform to
those beliefs we already have. We judge a potential belief attractive when
it can be integrated easily into the structure of our already-held beliefs.
Moreover, the perception of rapport - which we may here take as the perception that a potential belief is easily integrated - produces a feeling of
pleasure. This feeling of pleasure is the pleasure one feels in having the
way one looks at the world· validated. If I perceive a rapport between a
potential belief and my existing belief structure I experience a concomitant
feeling of pleasure because every new belief successfully integrated into
my structure ratifies the soundness of the structure as a whole and in so
doing, ratifies me as a cognitive being. This cannot but be pleasurable. It
follows, however, that belief formation is frequently a self-referential
process and that we often engage with reality by determining the degree to
which it conforms with what we already believe.
III.

This analysis of rapport suggests that if we want to make an argument persuasive, we should try to make the potential belief that is its conclusion
attractive. As we seek to understand what makes a potential belief attractive, it is useful to contrast the true but unpersuasive arguments of natural
theology to the beguiling but false products of the imagination. Pascal
famously calls the imagination "the dominant faculty in man" and writes
that "reason never wholly overcomes imagination, while the contrary is
quite common" (44). He offers the following example: "Put the world's
greatest philosopher on a plank that is wider than need be: if there is a
precipice below, although his reason may convince him that he is safe, his
imagination will prevail" (44). Elsewhere he writes that "Imagination
magnifies small objects with fantastic exaggeration until they fill our soul,
and with bold insolence cuts down great things to its own size ... " (551).
Pascal's account of the imagination further explains how the conclusions of
natural theology can seem unattractive in spite of their truth. One must
not fail to note that the philosopher of fragment 44 recognizes the truth of
his situation: his reason sees that he is safe, but it is unable to compel him
to accept his own safety. Pascal suggests that reason cannot always compel belief because we often shun the sober truths of our reason in favor of
the empty forms of our imagination.
We can see the most important manifestation of the imagination's power,
however, when we examine its role in human self-understanding.
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According to the previous analysis of rapport, we are attracted to things
that fit in with, resemble, and conform to our natures, which is to say that
what we find attractive depends on what sorts of creatures we are. On this
understanding, if we want to explain why we don't find something (including belief in God) attractive, we should look beyond the thing in question
and focus on our nature, "weak or strong as it may be" (585). Two possible
avenues open for us at this juncture and we could proceed down either
while remaining faithful to the spirit of Pascal. We could take the idea of
attractiveness as conformity to our natures in an unsparingly Augustinian
sense and analyze our failure to find belief in God attractive in terms of the
corruptions and limitations that have wrecked human nature. This avenue
leads above all to fragment 308 on the three orders - body, mind, and charity - and the suggestion that the supernatural order of charity, inhabited by
saints and oriented toward God, is simply incommensurable with the other
two orders. On this avenue, since all reasoning and discourse necessarily
remain trapped in the order of the intellect, we must wait for God's grace to
carry us across the "infinitely more infinite distance" that separates it from
the order of charity. But, for reasons that I have already suggested, this
avenue is not open to the natural theolOgian without heavy qualification.
On the other hand, we could recognize that Pascal offers multiple accounts
of human nature in the Pensees , some of which imply that if we could only
learn to see ourselves differently, we could make some progress in setting
ourselves aright. It is this second avenue, which seems more fruitful for the
project of natural theology, that I will pursue.
This avenue begins with the recognition that if we are attracted to things
that fit in with, resemble, and conform to our natures, and if we also have a
false understanding of our natures, then we are likely to be attracted to false
beliefs, beliefs that reinforce that false understanding. Conversely, we are
unlikely to be attracted to beliefs - like the belief in God - that threaten to
destabilize our false self-understanding. According to Pascal, such is our situation. Our attraction to the beautiful but empty forms of the imagination
has led us to construct a "self" that is a mere figment of the imagination:
We are not satisfied with the life we have in ourselves and our own
being. We want to lead an imaginary life in the eyes of others, and so
we try to make an impression. We strive constantly to embellish and
preserve our imaginary being, and neglect the real one. And if we are
calm, or generous, or loyal, we are anxious to have it known so that
we can attach these virtues to our other existence; we prefer to detach
them from our real self so as to unite them with the other (806).
It is important to note that Pascal identifies a self that is anterior to the
imaginary self (our "real self" and our flown being") and suggests that it
constructs the imaginary self deliberately.9 But if we create our imaginary
selves deliberately, then on some level we must be aware of their falsehood, and so the imaginary self is best seen as the product of self-deception. Fragment 978 also addresses the imaginary self in similar terms:

The nature of self-love and of this human self is to love only self and
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consider only self. But what is it to do? It cannot prevent the object
of its love from being full of faults and wretchedness ... it wants to be
perfect and sees that it is full of imperfections ... it conceives a deadly
hatred for the truth which rebukes it and convinces it of its faults. It
would like to do away with this truth, and not being able to destroy it
as such, it destroys it, as best it can, in the consciousness of itself and
others ...
The self tries to divert attention from its flaws by constructing "in the consciousness of itself and others" an imaginary self, as described in 806. Yet
here again the imaginary self does not completely obscure our knowledge
of our true selves. The self "sees that it is full of imperfections" and it
destroys the truth about its real being not completely, but only "as best it
can." The imaginary self is best understood as a product of self-deception,
but the very idea of self-deception implies that there is a part of the self
that is not deceived, a part that still recognizes the truth.lO
Two consequences for natural theology follow from this analysis of
attractiveness, rapport, and the imaginary self. First, we may conclude that
a false understanding of the human self underlies natural theology's failure
to convince. We have a false understanding of our natures and this false
understanding causes us to be attracted to things that fit in with, resemble,
and conform to our (imaginary) natures. Conversely, we are not attracted
to beliefs that threaten to undermine our false self-understandings. Belief in
God is just such a belief, one that has the power to undermine drastically
the beliefs that support our imaginary self-understandings. No one really
wants this conceptual carnage and so we turn away from belief in God,
which implies that we also turn away from natural theology's sound reasoning about God's existence. Second, because our attraction to our imaginary selves does not completely efface our knowledge of our true selves,
we can be made to recognize them. These two conclusions suggest that if a
sound argument of natural theology is to claim the persuasiveness that it
deserves, then it must go hand in hand with an attack on our false selfunderstandings. An attack on our false self-understandings can pave the
way for a recognition of our true selves, which do share rapport with God,
and the recognition that we can (and do) share rapport with God is the first
step in making belief in God seem attractive.
In summary, Pascal criticizes traditional arguments for God's existence
on the grounds that they are too remote from human experience and, hence,
unattractive. At the same time, he also criticizes the imagination for its
deceptive attractiveness. He also argues that our false self-understandings
lead us to reject the possibility of rapport with God, which works against
any effort to make belief in God attractive. This dynamic, in turn, makes
the arguments of natural theology unpersuasive. Although Pascal sets the
unattractive conclusions of natural theology against the attractive products
of the imagination, the rich imagery of the Pensees and the skill with which
Pascal uses it for his own apologetic task suggests that we would do well to
regard natural theology and the imagination as complements rather than
contraries. Even if the imagination can make the conclusions of our reason
less attractive, it cannot overthrow our faculties of reason altogether. This
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fact should lead us to search for ways to use and direct the imagination
appropriately and not merely to bewail its power for ill.
IV.

We are at last in a position to chart a new and, hopefully, more successful
course for natural theology. Successful argumentation in natural theology
would recognize that a false understanding of the human self is what
makes the arguments of natural theology seem unattractive and unpersuasive and so it would first attack that false self-understanding. It would
thereby be attentive to the dynamics of rapport, which means that it would
seek to render belief in God attractive by trying to show how rapport with
God is not only possible but already actual. It would also harness the
attractive forms produced by the imagination to natural theology'S own
true claims. It would thus proceed with attention to rhetorical form as well
as to philosophical rigor. What might such argumentation look like? Not
surprisingly, we have no better example than that provided by Pascal.
Whatever else natural theology may be, its tangible product, its endresult, is a piece of discourse-- a piece of discourse that aims to persuade.
As such, it is answerable to the standards of rhetoric and literary aesthetics.
Consequently, when we evaluate an example of natural theology, we
should pay close attention to its literary form and ask ourselves whether
that form is appropriate, given its rhetorical aim - persuading someone
that God exists. It may well be that the typical form of natural theology,
inductive or deductive argumentation embedded in an academic paper, is
frequently not the best one. Indeed, we natural theologians should have
learned this lesson from one of our greatest opponents. It is surely no accident that perhaps the most devastating critique of natural theology is not
presented as a treatise but as a dialogue, David Hume's Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion. If I am correct that the deductive argument is
not always the best literary form for persuading someone that God exists,
then natural theologians should be open to the idea of using other literary
forms. To that end, I nominate the form of the fragment, a literary form
that may seem scandalously unphilosophical, but one that Pascal and
Friedrich Nietzsche, among others, used to great effect.
It is likely that the fragmentary character of the collection we call the
Pen sees is merely an accident of its unfinished status. Nevertheless, the
form of the text we have is not without significance. There are, after all,
other ways of composing a text than by jotting down a thousand disjointed
thoughts on scraps of paper and imposing rudimentary classifications on
only a few of them. That Pascal was composing his text in this way, in this
form, entitles us to comment upon his choice. And, without question, the
form of the fragment - the form without apparent form - is uniquely suited to Pascal's rhetorical purposes.
The fragment is essentially open in a way that other literary styles are
not. U The demand for form is the demand for limits and boundaries, and a
fragmentary text, to a greater degree than any other kind of text, reveals
the possibility of meaning that is not captured by expected forms. The
fragment challenges the fixedness of all classification schemes and bound-
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aries, including the boundaries separating truth from falsehood.
Deductive reasoning neatly divides reality into categories and necessarily
culminates in final conclusions, and even dialectic tends toward a resolution of the tensions it creates. But the fragment, unlike deductive or dialectical reasoning, fully embraces the emergence of seemingly contradictory
truths. In so doing, it unsettles our reason and our fixed perspectives on
reality. This unsettling is perhaps a necessary precursor to the forging of
radically new perspectives and beliefs like the belief in God. As we read a
series of fragments like those of the Pensees, we are constantly forced to
shift from one perspective to another in a way that leads us to see that reality is not exhausted by our own interpretations of it. Once we have recognized this fact, we are far more open to affirming ideas that we previously
would have scorned. I should be clear that I don't affirm, and I don't think
that Pascal would affirm, that there really are absolutely contradictory
truths. I am merely pointing out that the fragment, as a literary device that
presents contradictions without resolving them, can lead us to be more
open to the possibility that we have not been seeing the world correctly,
surely a key step in any effort to persuade someone to adopt a belief to
which he is not already inclined.
Moreover, the reading of fragmentary texts can be an aesthetic experience characterized by sparks of insight and feelings of pleasure. These feelings of pleasure allow the fragment to present in an attractive form (a form
that appears uncreated, but is in fact highly artful) content that would otherwise be rejected as alien. Consider fragment 210: "All men naturally hate
each other. We have used concupiscence as best we can to make it serve the
common good, but this is a mere sham and a false image of charity, for
essentially it is just hate." I certainly disagree with the bald assertions that
all men hate each other and the common good is a sham, but when I read
these two sentences I cannot help feeling intrigued and wondering what
Pascal means. In so wondering, I entertain the possibility of their truth and
grant them a kind of surface plausibility that I might not have granted them
if they were presented as parts of a deductive argument. When a reader
reads a fragmentary text, she is captured by the aesthetic experience of the
fragment. The fragment is able to bypasses our entrenched defenses and
elicit rapport directly. It is therefore the literary form ideally suited to helpingthe reader entertain the possibility of rapport with God.

v.
We can see the power of the fragmentary form at work in natural theology
when we examine the famous wager fragment as an example of artful and
persuasive rhetoric, and not just as an example of probabilistic reasoning. As
discussed above, Pascal criticizes traditional arguments for God's existence
on the grounds that they are too remote from human experience and, hence,
unattractive. At the same time, he criticizes the imagination for its often
deceptive attractiveness. All ideal apologetic argument, therefore, would be
one that harnesses the attractive forms produced by the imagination to the
true claims of natural theology. Pascal presents just such an argument in
fragment 418, the wager fragment, entitled "Infini-Rien" (infinity-nothing).
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The literary character of the wager fragment is often overlooked. Indeed,
it is instructive to compare the style of this fragment with that of most com-

mentaries on it. With its dialogic structure and its explicit appeals to the
imagination, the wager fragment is a work of art that displays real dramatic
tension. It is comprised of such elegantly written passages as: "At the far
end of this infinite distance a coin is being spun which will come down
heads or tails. How will you wager? Reason cannot make you choose
either, reason cannot prove either wrong ... " A great deal of the philosophical commentary on the wager, by contrast, looks like this: "Suppose there is
a matrix in which the betting options are Y and -Y (where Y is some being
Pn exists and -Y is Pn does not exist) ... "12 Whatever the interest of such
treatments, it seems fair to say that they neglect some important literary
nuances of Pascal's text, nuances that (I suggest) are important to his argument. I cannot provide a comprehensive treatment of the literary, philosophical, and theological themes of fragment 418 here.13 I can offer a brief
analysis of certain overlooked aspects of it, aspects that underscore what I
take to be its rhetorical goal: the fusion of natural theology and the imagination through the presentation of a drama of self-erasure.
First, it is important to notice that the whole fragment is presented as a
debate about the conditions of rapport. This is especially clear in the
beginning. The fragment opens with an unbeliever asserting that we are
essentially bodies, bound by "number, time, dimensions," and that therefore we can know finite things alone. 14 The Christian immediately challenges this view: it cannot be the case that physical form determines what
we are able to know because we are able to know the existence of the infinite. The unbeliever rejoins: we are able to know the existence of the infinite because it, like us, has extension, although without limits. But since
God has neither extension nor limits, he continues, we cannot know the
existence of God. At this point in the debate, the cognitive barrier between
human beings and God lies in the fact that we, unlike God, "have extension." The unbeliever agrees that we can conceptualize limitlessness but
only limitless extension. The Christian must undermine this idea if the
unbeliever is to believe that God exists. I '
Second, the way he undermines it is little noted: the Christian undermines the unbeliever's concept of the self. If the self is without extension,
then it can share rapport with a God without extension. The probabilistic
sections of fragment 418 - regardless of their mathematical merits - deploy
subtle linguistic tricks with the word "infinite" in order to undermine the
unbeliever's preconception that the self is bound by the body's external
form. The wager, as discussed, is set in a context that questions how infinity is intelligible. Recall that the unbeliever initially identifies the self with
"number, time, dimensions" and suggests that these qualities determine
intelligibility. The Christian takes notions of infinity based on these concepts and subtly leads the unbeliever toward a concept of infinity that he
previously had not endorsed, that of infinite happiness. First, he takes the
concept of infinite number, a concept the unbeliever accepts, and innocently slides from "an infinite number of chances" to "an infinity of infinitely
happy life." The unbeliever doesn't object to this move. But what kind of
being understands what "an infinity of infinitely happy life" is? Not one
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that is strictly limited to rapport with things characterized by number,
time, and dimension. Similarly, the Christian uses the phrase "infinite distance," another concept affirmed by the unbeliever, several times in quick
succession before concluding with the phrase "infinite prize."16 But if the
unbeliever can understand an infinite prize, especially if that infinite prize
is an infinity of infinitely happy life, then he must be able to understand
God, who is elsewhere identified with happiness (407). But if he can
understand this concept of God, then he himself must not be the sort of
being that he once thought. The probabilistic sections of fragment 418 do
not convert the unbeliever, but demonstrate to him that the barriers to his
belief come from his mistaken conceptions of the self. The unbeliever is so
attached to "noxious pleasure, glory, and good living" that he identifies his
true self with the body and then falsely concludes that his bodily existence
makes God unintelligible to him.
Third, if we pay close attention to Pascal's use of pronouns it becomes
even more clear that the wager fragment recounts the drama of the erasure
of the false self and its replacement with the true self. From the end of the
preamble on rapport, when the dialogic structure of the fragment begins in
earnest until his conversion, the unbeliever, and only the unbeliever,
speaks with the pronoun "I." Moreover, every statement after he is asked,
"how will you wager?" contains the word "1." Only after the unbeliever's
conversion does the Christian begin using the first person pronoun, whereas the unbeliever ~uddenly does not. Instead, curiously enough, the unbeliever exclaims, "O! ce discours me transporte, me ravit!" Krailsheimer translates this sentence as "How these words fill me with rapture and delight,"
but they are equally rendered "Oh, how this discourse transports me and
carries me off!" I suggest that Pascal deliberately puts in play both meanings of transporter and ravir in order to highlight the fact that the unbeliever's lime," his false self, has been spirited away by the power of the
Christian's argument.
Though it may seem farfetched, we should take seriously the idea that
Pascal used pronouns with polemical intent in this fragment. According to
Pascal's contemporaries, he was keenly aware of his own use of first-person pronouns, and he regarded the words ''1'' and "me" as antithetical to
piety and civility.17 In this fragment, the false self of the unbeliever has been
carried away and the Christian now feels free to say "1" because, according
to Pascal, only the Christian is entitled to say "1"- the "I" of the true self,
the self that, as the Christian says at the end of fragment 418, "submits its
being" to God. This use of etre in the Christian's concluding statement
recalls the self's "real being" (etre veritable) discussed in fragment 806. It
also invites a richer interpretation of the Christian's preceding statement,
"you will have wagered on something certain and infinite for which you
have paid nothing."18 In truth, the unbeliever has paid with his false self,
but that is indeed "nothing."
Finally, we must note that the real target of Pascal's verbal machinations
is not some fictional unbeliever, but the living person who reads his text.
When we bear this fact in mind, we can see in fragment 418 the full force of
Pascal's ability to impress literary artfulness into the service of natural theology. By the very act of reading the fragment, we must first identify with the
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unbeliever: as we read, we speak his "I" with our inner voices and we are
addressed directly by the Christian as "you." As the Christian "1" replaces
the unbeliever's "1," we, continuing to read, ~cannot help but participate in
this move. By the time he puts the words "OJ ce discours me transporte, me
ravitf" in our own mouths, Pascal has carried us a long way down a path we
didn't even know we were on, the path to rapport with God.
The wager fragment is a good example of the direction that natural theology should take if it is to claim the esteem that rightfully belongs to it. It
begins with an attack on our false self-understandings, which paves the
way for the recognition that rapport with God is possible. It impresses the
power of the imagination into the service of the true claims of natural theology. In the wager fragment as elsewhere, Pascal presents philosophical
arguments as aesthetic artifacts. We would do well to imitate him and
deploy a splendid variety of literary forms in our arguments. If we do not,
the prospects for natural theology will remain grim. It will inevitably step
into the breach with a whisper instead of a shout, bearing a defaced reason
as its only standard.

Chicago, Illinois
NOTES
1. Although the project of natural theology may not assume any specifically Christian commitments, it is Christian natural theologians with whom I
am primarily concerned in this essay. I suspect, however, that my argument
applies equally to natural theologians of other monotheistic faiths.
2. If the phrase "the existence of God" raises too many onto-theological
hackles, the reader may feel free to substitute, e.g., "the reality of God."
Similarly, when I speak of "demonstrating the existence of God," I intend this
phrase to cover inductive as well as deductive arguments.
3.
See, e.g., Terence D. Cuneo "Combating the Noetic Effects of Sin:
Pascal's Strategy for Natural Theology," Faith and Philosophy, 11 (1994), pp. 645662 and Daniel C. Fouke, "Argument in Pascal's Pensees," History of Philosophy
Quarterly, 6 (1989) 57-68.
4. I should be clear that I have in mind robust arguments offered in good
faith, not pseudo-arguments like "If 7+5=12 then God exists ... "
5. All citations given in the text in parentheses are from Blaise Pascal,
Pensees, trans. AJ Krailsheimer (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), which uses
the Lafuma numbering scheme. As much as possible, however, I leave the
word "rapport" untranslated.
6. For example, 199,298,308,418,733,826,919.
7. Academie Francaise. Le dictionnaire de /'Academie francoise. Paris: 1694,
p.281.
8. Blaise Pascal, Pensees and Other Writings, trans. Honor Levi, (Oxford
World's Classics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 195.
9. That, I take it, is the force of all the active verbs he uses in 806 ( "we are
not satisfied ... we want ... we try ... we strive ... we are anxious ... we prefer").
10. Of course, "the very idea of self-deception" is itself disputed by contemporary philosophers. My argument here depends not on some particular
account of self-deception but on the idea that we can be led to recognize the
truth about ourselves.
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11. Much of what follows is a distillation of lectures on the fragment given
by David Tracy from 1999-2001 at the University of Chicago Divinity School.
12. Jeff Jordan, "The Many God's Objection," in Jeff Jordan, ed. Gambling on
God: Essays on Pascal's Wager (Lanham, MD.: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers,
1994), p. 104. I am being grossly unfair to Jordan, of course. The question of
whether there are probabilistic arguments in favor of religious belief is a perfectly appropriate one. I merely wish to emphasize that there is more to fragment 418 than betting matrices.
13. The best literary analysis of the wager fragment that I have found is
Bernard Howells, "The Interpretation of Pascal's 'Pari'," The Modern Language
Review, 79 (1984), pp. 45-63.
14. The wager fragment certainly turns into a dialogue between an unbeliever and a Christian, but it is difficult to say whether the fragment's opening
section should also be understood as a dialogue. I believe that it should but
my reading does not depend on it. It is certainly the case that the opening section presents representative skeptical and Christian lines of argument.
15. Most commentators claim that it is the rationality of believing in God,
rather than the existence of God per se, that is at stake in the wager. I myself
am not convinced that it makes sense to separate these questions, but in any
case, the proposition that the wager concerns is: "Let us say, 'either God is, or
he is not.'"
16. I note for the record that these movements are found also in the original
French, not just in translation.
17. Antoine Arnauld, in the Port-Royal Logic, writes: "Pascal, who knew as
much of genuine rhetoric as did any man ... maintained that a well-bred man
ought to avoid mentioning himself even to the point of avoiding the words 'I'
and 'me.' He was accustomed to saying that Christian piety annihilated the '1',
while human civility concealed and suppressed the 'me.'" The Art of Thinking or
The Port Royal Logic, section 20.6. In llie spirit of fairness, however, I should
also note that the Pensees contain no fewer than 753 occurrences of je or j' and
99 of moi, according to Hugh M. Davidson and Pierre H. Dube, A Concordance
to Pascal's Pensees (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975).
18. The verb is donner, not payer-literally, "you have given nothing" (vous
n'avez rien donne). There is a significant difference between understanding this
conclusion in terms of the language of gift instead of the language of payment.
19. I would like to thank Franklin Gamwell, Karin Meyers, Richard
Rosengarten, Lea Schweitz, Kathryn Tanner, and David Tracy for their comments on a previous version of this paper.

